We conceptualize the past and the present as dimensions of experience and ask whether past processing must affect decisions about the present and whether present processing must affect decisions about the past. The paradigm is speeded classification: Ss classified a stimulus's past spatial position and tried to ignore information about present position (Experiments 1-4) , or classified present position, while attempting to ignore past position (Experiments 5-6). We found that in classifying the past, Ss were unable to ignore present position, unless it was processed apart from the retrieval cue. In classifying the present, subjects could ignore past position completely. We conclude that a processing asymmetry exists, reflecting perhaps a logical asymmetry in the information required to make past or present decisions.
Among the recent trends in memory research is the shift away from dependent measures that refer explicitly to the past. Rather than asking subjects merely to place an event in some prior context of time and space or reproduce it with cues, one can assess retention indirectly through the role that past processing plays in the processing of the present. In studies of repetition priming, for example, identification of a stimulus is often facilitated by earlier processing of the same (or similar) event (e.g., Feustel, Shiffrin, & Salasoo, 1983; Forster & Davis, 1984; Morton, 1979; Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977) . Recent work on implicit memory has produced an even broader array of facilitatory and inhibitory effects (see Johnson & Hasher, 1987; Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1987) .
In the present set of experiments, we consider a new way of conceptualizing interactions between the past and the present through an application of the methodological tool kit popularized by Garner, namely, the speeded classification paradigm (e.g., Garner, 1974; Garner & Felfoldy, 1970 ). Garner's paradigm was developed initially to study interactions in the processing of perceptual dimensions, but we extend it here to investigate the processing of dimensional values that are separated in time (cf. Nairne & Melara, 1990) . To illustrate the logic, consider the presentation of stimuli constructed from specific values along a pair of dimensions, such as values along the color dimensions of saturation and brightness. The researcher is interested in what effect, if any, irrelevant variation along one of these dimensions has on speeded classification of the other. Suppose that subjects are asked to classify saturation and that on a trial-by-trial basis we vary brightness orthogonally. If subjects are slower and Portions of this research were presented at the 31st annual meeting of the Psychonomic Society in New Orleans, Louisiana, November 1990. Preparation of this article was supported in part by National Institutes of Health Grant NS28617 to Robert D. Melara. We thank Larry Jacoby, Colin MacLeod, and an anonymous reviewer for their excellent comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert D. Melara, Department of Psychological Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907-1364. less accurate to classify saturation relative to a condition in which brightness is not varied, then we say that saturation interacts with brightness. If subjects are just as fast and accurate in classifying saturation when brightness is varied orthogonally as when brightness is held constant, then we say that saturation is separable from brightness. As we will discuss later, the nature and form of such dimensional crosstalk have been widespread and have been applied successfully to a number of problems in cognitive psychology (see, e.g., Melara & Marks, 1990a , 1990b , 1990d .
In extending the speeded classification paradigm to the study of memory, we modify the usual question of whether crosstalk occurs between two perceptual dimensions and ask instead: Does crosstalk occur between values of the same dimension at two different times? Empirically, this amounts to determining whether subjects can classify an attribute (value) at Time t2 (e.g., the saturation of a stimulus at Time t2) without experiencing intrusion from attributes at earlier points in time (e.g., saturation at Time t~). Is the subject capable of ignoring the past history of a stimulus when its processing record is still readily available but orthogonal (and potentially interfering) to the task at hand? Note that our emphasis is on subjects' control over past-to-present interactions, not simply on whether one can document a form of transfer. From the perspective of exemplar theories of perception, which rely critically on the recruitment of past processing episodes (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) , one might expect it to be difficult to filter the prior occurrence of information during perceptual processing at Time t2.
Alternatively, one can direct the decision backward in time toward Time tt and ask whether subjects can effectively ignore irrelevant variation of the dimension at Time t2. Such a procedure mimics the more traditional memory experiment in which the dependent measure is grounded in the past.
1 In this article we sometimes refer to the dimension at Time t2 as the perceptual dimension and to classifications at Time t2 as perceptual tasks. We emphasize that this term serves merely as a convenient label. We do not assume that the nature of interactive processing that may occur with these dimensions or in these tasks is necessarily perceptually based.
Under these conditions, the concern is with the effect that an item's current perceptual attributes has on recovery of past attributes. In a memory experiment, we would consider attributes from Time t2 as cues for aid in recovering the prior episode; from the perspective of Garner's paradigm, we ask whether it is possible to ignore such cues when over trials they are uninformative with respect to successful retention performance. According to cue-dependent theories of retrieval, such as those bolstered by experiments on encoding specificity (see Tulving, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) , subjects should have great difficulty attending to the past without the intrusion of an item's current perceptual status.
The speeded classification paradigm has a number of diagnostic advantages. First, one can address whether interactions between the processing of dimensions are mandatory (in the sense that a decision about one requires interaction with the other) or optional and under the strategic control of the subject (see Melara, 1990) . If one merely documents that one experience affects another, as in repetition priming studies in which a past presentation has some effect on the present, then the obligatory nature of the interaction is not revealed without making other assumptions (e.g., that short stimulus onset asynchronies preclude strategic processing; see Neely & Keefe, 1989 , for a review). The speeded classification paradigm dictates that a distinction be made between processes of necessity and processes of choice.
Speeded classification confers an additional advantage: Because the task demands are directed at the interaction between attributes separated in time, there is a symmetry to the investigation. Crosstalk can occur in either direction, so issues motivating the priming literature (how the past affects the present) can be addressed with the same methodology that is used to identify cuing effects in the memory literature (how the present affects the past).
Finally, because decisions are made about attributes, there is less concern about how a particular dimension affects some poorly understood global decision, an issue that often plagues other fields of inquiry. In the repetition priming literature, for example, there is a great deal of interest in whether repetition effects obtain across changes (from study to test) in values on particular dimensions (e.g., language, modality, or case). Differential transfer effects across dimensions are then used to describe the structure of memory mechanisms (e.g., Kirsner & Dunn, 1985) . One of the problems with this approach, however, is that little is known about how any given dimension influences general measures such as naming or lexical decision, and thus whether it is appropriate to make comparisons among dimensions. As we will discuss next, the present study uses a single dimension of space and examines how attributes from this one dimension are affected by processing of the past or the present.
Specifics of the Paradigm
In each experiment, subjects will be required to classify values along one dimension (e.g., past position of a stimulus on a cathode-ray tube [CRT]), ignoring irrelevant variation along the other dimension (e.g., its present position). If the two dimensions interact then, according to Garner's logic, subjects should be unable to attend selectively to the classification dimension; that is, subjects should suffer interference (in terms of speed and accuracy of classification) from uncorrelated variation along the irrelevant dimension. The main measure of dimensional interaction is Garner interference (Pomerantz, 1983 (Pomerantz, , 1986 , defined as the difference in reaction time (RT) between classifications in which the irrelevant dimension is held constant, called baseline tasks, and classifications in which the irrelevant dimension is varied orthogonally, called filtering tasks. Dimensions that interact always yield significant Garner interference. Separable dimensions lead to no interference.
A second indication that two dimensions interact is an effect on classification of correlated variation between the relevant and irrelevant dimensions. A positive correlation between the dimensions of past position and present position means that throughout a block of trials, the position of an object at Time t2 (present) always matches that object's position at Time tl (past). A negative correlation between these dimensions means that throughout a block of trials, the position of an object at Time t2 always mismatches that object's position at Time tl. If the correlation, positive or negative, leads to faster performance than baseline, then a redundancy gain has obtained; if the correlation leads to performance slower than baseline, then a redundancy loss has obtained. The classification of separable dimensions is typicaUy unaffected by correlational redundancy.
Another way to look at the issue of match-mismatch, but one that only appears with certain pairs of interacting dimensions, is an effect of congruity. This effect obtains between dimensions whose values are related meaningfully. In the present study, for example, on each trial of filtering tasks the value of past position either matches or mismatches the value of present position. In previous investigations, researchers have found that subjects recognize whether values on dimensions correspond (e.g., position and pitch; Melara, 1989b) . And, in speeded classification, researchers have discovered that in filtering tasks subjects respond faster on congruent trials--that is, when values match--than on incongruent trials--that is, when values mismatch (see, e.g., Clark & Brownell, 1976; Melara & Marks, 1990d; Pomerantz, 1983) . The difference in RT between incongruent and congruent trials defines a congruity score. In each experiment reported here, we test whether this score is significantly greater than zero, that is, whether an effect of congruity has obtained.
Previous experiments testing for dimensional interaction have used pairs of dimensions coincident in time, thereby considering only processing of the present. In this article, we report six experiments that examine whether a dimension paired with itself (called identity dimensions; Melara & O'Brien, 1990 ) but displaced in time interacts. We are therefore examining processing of the past and its role in processing of the present. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first use of speeded classification for this purpose. Fortunately, because speeded classification has been so well studied, we can evaluate how the pattern obtained when past is paired with present fits with known forms of dimensional interaction.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, subjects were asked to remember the past spatial position of a visual stimulus; we tested their ability to ignore its current spatial position. At Time h, all subjects saw two geometric objects, one on the left side of a CRT screen and one on the fight side of a CRT screen. At Time t2, one of these objects was presented again, either on the left or on the right, and subjects were required to respond about its Time h position. All decisions about spatial position at Time h were made at Time t2. Thus, the critical question asked whether subjects would be capable of remembering the Time h position without suffering interference from irrelevant positional information at Time t:.
Method
Subjects. Ten Purdue University undergraduate students (5 men, 5 women) volunteered to participate in this experiment. All were experienced in Garuer-style RT experiments, although not in this particular experiment.
Stimuli and apparatus. The stimuli were diamonds and circles generated by a Commodore 64 microcomputer on a Thompson VM 3102 monochrome monitor (P-31 phosphor). The shapes appeared in white against a uniform amber screen background. Stimuli were viewed at a distance of approximately 65 era, subtending 0.44* of visual angle. Stimuli appeared either 3.52* left or right of midline center.
For each of the two dimensions, namely, past position and present position, a diamond or a circle appeared in either a left or a fight screen position. Each trial began with a diamond in one position and a circle in the other; the two objects appeared simultaneously, and their configuration defined the values of past position (e.g., circle-left and diamond-right). After this first display, a second display appeared containing either a diamond or a circle in either a left or a right screen position; this attribute was the value of present position. Shape of the attribute in present position served as a cue to past position: On each trial, subjects responded to their recollection of that shape's earlier spatial position.
With two possible attributes of past position (diamond-left and circle-fight; circle-left and diamond-right) and four possible attributes of present position (diamond-left, diamond-right, circle-left, and circle-right), eight different stimuli were created. These stimuli were used to construct five tasks of past-position classification, each having 48 trials. Two tasks were baseline, one involved dimensions correlated positively, one involved dimensions correlated negatively, and one was filtering. In each task, subjects identified the past position (left or right) of the cued shape. Equal numbers of each stimulus were included in each task. Procedure. Subjects were tested individually in a quiet room.
Order of task performance was determined by Latin square. Before performing the set of tasks, subjects practiced classification in one of the baseline tasks. Practice data were discarded.
Trials appeared randomly within each task. Each of the tasks was performed twice consecutively; analyses were performed on the average of the two runs. In each trial, the first display (i.e., value of past position) appeared for 1,000 ms. A 1,000-ms blank interval separated the fn'st display from the second display (i.e., value of present position). A response terminated the second display. Past-position classifications were made by moving a mounted joystick either up or down. Response assignment was counterbalanced across subjects. Time elapsed between the onset of the cue and the subject's response was measured in milliseconds with a software timer (Price, 1979) . Subjects were instructed to ignore the position of the cue in the second display and to respond to their memory of the shape's earlier position as quickly as possible without error. On each trial, subjects were informed of incorrect responses and abnormally slow responses (> 1200 ms) through screen message; trials with slow responses were repeated later in the task. After each task, subjects were informed of their mean RT and error rate. A session typically lasted 45 rain.
Results
Mean RTs and proportion of errors in each of the five tasks appear in Table 1 . The overall error rate was .04. The correlation between RTs and errors, computed according to average performance in each of the five tasks, was .68. A positive rather than negative correlation suggests no great trade-off between speed and accuracy in this experiment.
Analysis of correlated and uncorrelated dimensions.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on RTs averaged across the two runs. Condition (five levels: two baseline, two correlated, and one filtering) was the only independent variable; this factor was significant, F(4, 36) --10.95, p < .001. To evaluate the nature of this effect, a series of planned contrasts was performed using the pooled within-subjects error term (MSc = 3,175.27; see Winer, 1971, pp. 385-386;  see also Kirk, 1982, pp. 103-106) . First, performance in the faltering task (620 ms) was 110 ms worse than averaged performance in the baseline tasks (510 ms), a significant effect of Garner interference, F(1, 36) ---25.59, p < .001. Second, redundancy led to different effects for positively and nega- An identical ANOVA was performed on the error data. Here we found no effect of condition, F(4, 36) = 1.24, ns:
The five tasks led to a similar pattern of errors.
Effect of congruity. We define a stimulus analysis as an analysis that examines RTs to individual stimuli in the filtering task. In this analysis, we compared RTs on congruent and incongruent trials to examine the effect of dimensional congruity. For each subject, a congruity score was derived, defined as the difference in RT to trials in which past and present positions mismatched (incongruent) from trials in which past and present positions matched (congruent). Thus, a positive congruity score means that subjects responded faster when attributes matched than when they mismatched. The average congruity score in this task was 52 ms. This score is significantly greater than zero, t(9) = 3.01, p = .02.
Discussion
Experiment I showed a clear influence of present spatial position on past spatial position. Subjects were unable to attend selectively to the memory dimension, that is, to avoid variation in the perceptual dimension. Moreover, subjects benefited only from a positive correlation between the two dimensions. Negative correlation led to neither gain nor loss. And, in the filtering task, where it was best to ignore the irrelevant dimension, subjects responded faster when attributes from the two dimensions matched than when they mismatched.
This pattern--Garner interference, an effect of congruity, and gain only to dimensions correlated positivelyZ--has appeared repeatedly in tests of dimensional interaction (e.g., Clark & Brownell, 1976; Melara & Marks, 1990d; Pomerantz, 1983) . It is the signature of what Melara and his colleagues (Melara & Marks, 1990d; Melara & O'Brien, 1990 ) call semantic crosstalk. The term stresses our theoretical belief that such interaction is due to the postperceptual exchange of meaning units. Thus, for example, if past position and present position are each represented as separate high-order channels ofprocessing, as in Panel A of Figure 1 , one can conceptualize the effect of the present on the past as the flow of information between channels at a semantic level of processing (represented by arrows).
One can distinguish the pattern signifying semantic erosstalk from a different pattern obtained between dimensions that crosstalk at a sensory-perceptual level of processing. Sensory-perceptual crosstalk is diagnosed with the following effects: Garner interference, redundancy gain for dimensions correlated either positively or negatively, and no effect of congruity. As is depicted theoretically in Panel B of Figure 1 , interaction between the color dimensions of saturation and brightness provides one example of sensory-perceptual erosstalk (e.g., Garner & Felfoldy, 1970) .
The particular theoretical conception notwithstanding, pairs of perceptual dimensions appear to lead to one of these two empirical signatures. 3 The pattern obtained in the present experiment clearly signifies semantic crosstalk. It resembles closely that obtained with corresponding dimensions, such as the cross-modal dimensions of color and pitch or position and pitch (Melara, 1989a; Melara & O'Brien, 1987) . Moreover, the pattern is unlike that obtained between perceptually interacting dimensions, such as saturation and brightness (Garner & Felfoldy, 1970 ). It appears, therefore, that the influence of present on past found in this experiment is probably not attributable to low-level perceptual characteristics of the cuing stimulus. Rather, the influence is more likely postperceptual, owing perhaps to the semantic relatedness among present and past spatial attributes. We evaluate this hypothesis further in Experiments 2 and 3.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate Experiment 1, except that space was defined this time in terms of a perceived depth plane. Geometric figures were located perceptually nearer or farther on a depth-inducing grid. Otherwise, Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment I. Thus, this experiment permits us to reproduce our previous effects and to generalize them to a different form of spatial position.
Method
Subjects. Ten Purdue University undergraduates (2 men, 8 women) from the same pool as Experiment 1 volunteered to particio pate in this experiment.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. The stimuli were squares and triangles generated by an Amiga 500 microcomputer and displayed on a Commodore 1084 color monitor (P-22 phosphor). Stimuli appeared in the context of four simultaneous distance cues: (a) linear perspective (i.e., a set of parallel vertical lines that converged on a vanishing point); (b) gradient of texture (i.e., a set of parallel horizontal lines whose spacing systematically decreased as screen position changed from low to high); (e) relative size (i.e., near stimuli were larger in size than far stimuli); (d) height in the picture plane (i.e., near stimuli were lower in the plane than far stimuli). These cues created a compelling sense of depth. Near stimuli subtended 2.9* of visual angle; far stimuli subtended 0.79* of visual angle. Stimuli were separated vertically by 4.4". Eight trial types and five memory classification tasks were created from the two past-position attributes (i.e., square-near and trianglefar; triangle-near and square-far) and four present-position attributes (i.e., square-near; square-far; triangle-near; triangle-far), as in Experiment 1. The past-position display lasted 910 ms; 910 ms then separated the termination of that display and the presentation of the present-position display. Memory classifications were made by press-2 When correlated negatively, dimensions that crosstalk semantically may show baseline-level performance (e.g., Melara & O'Brien, 1987) or redundancy loss (e.g., Clark & Brownell, 1976; Melara, 1989a) , but not redundancy gain.
3 Discussion of a third empirical signature, discovered between certain geometric dimensions by Pomerantz and his colleagues (e.g., Pomerantz & Garner, 1973; Pomerantz & Schwaitzberg, 1975) , is beyond the scope of this article. ing either the left key or the fight key of an Amiga dual-key mouse (response assignment counterbalanced). RTs were measured in milliseconds with the 716-kHz clock in the Complex Interface Adapter 8520A chip of the Motorola 68000 (see Wright, 1986) . All other aspects duplicated Experiment 1.
Results
Mean RTs and proportions of errors appear in Table 2 . The overall error rate was .03, Speed correlated .68 with accuracy (computed as in Experiment I).
An ANOVA performed on RTs showed a significant effect of condition, F(4, 36) ---8.59, p < .001. A series of planned contrasts was performed, as in Experiment 1 (MSe --1,812.66). First, there was a significant effect of Garner interference, with the faltering task (584 ms) performed 38 ms slower than the averaged baseline tasks (546 ms), F(1, 36) = 5.49, p --.02. It should be noted, however, that the two baseline tasks differed, F(1, 36) = 4.22, p ---.05, presumably because the visual angle subtended by far stimuli (the cues in one baseline task) was appreciably smaller than the visual An ANOVA of error rates revealed an overall effect of condition,/7(4, 36) ffi 2.91, p ---.03. However, planned contrasts, MSc < .001, showed that the only significant difference involved fewer errors when dimensions correlated positively relative to baseline performance, F(I, 36) = 8.04, p < .01.
Stimulus analysis of the filtering task uncovered a 47-ms advantage of congruent RTs over incongruent RTs. The congruity score was significantly greater than zero, t(9) = 2.97, p = .02.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 generally replicated those of Experiment 1. Variation in present position significantly disrupted selective attention to prior position. Moreover, subjects recognized and were affected by the matching or mismatching relation between attributes on the two dimensions. Subjects made decisions significantly faster when past and present positions matched than when they mismatched. This was evident both in the finding of a significant congruity effect in the filtering task and that subjects showed gain when dimensions were correlated positively (a task where attributes always matched) but loss when dimensions were correlated negatively (a task where attributes always mismatched). As in Experiment 1, the pattern obtained here mimics that found with other unimodal or cross-modal dimensions whose attributes are related meaningfully.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 examined past and present spatial information from the perspective of a single modality, namely, vision. In Experiment 3 we evaluate whether our findings are restricted to matched perceptual codes by testing the effects of spatial information between two modalities, namely, vision and audition. The logic here is that to map spatial relations of auditory space onto those of visual space, a more abstract representational scheme is required relative to the unimodal ease. If these codes are formed at a more abstract level than those that caused the interactive pattern of Experiments 1 and 2, then we would expect a failure to replicate that pattern in the cross-modal case. If, on the other hand, the interaction of past with present is due to similarity relations between postperceptual codes, then we would expect to recover the earlier pattern.
In this experiment, subjects listened to two spoken letters, one presented to the left ear and one presented to the fight ear, and were required to remember which ear heard which letter. A visual letter then cued one of the auditory letter locations. We ask, Does variation in the visual letter's location, when irrelevant to the task, nonetheless affect subjects' ability to classify past auditory locations?
Method
Subjects. Ten experienced Purdue University graduate and undergraduate subjects (4 men, 6 women) volunteered to participate.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. The stimuli were generated by an Amiga 500 mierccomputer. Visual stimuli were the letters A and E presented in either a right or left screen position (right and left separated by 4.31 °) in white on a blue screen haekground. Auditory stimuli were the spoken letters A (ARPABET phoneme code ffi EY.) and E (ARPABET phoneme code ffi IY.), one letter directed to the fight headphone channel and the other directed to the left headphone channel. The spoken letters had a pitch of 110 Hz, a waveform sampling frequency of 22000 Hz, and a speaking rate of 200 words per minute (duration of 430 ms), which gives the subjective impression of an adult male. Auditory signals were directed to a Realistic SA-150 amplifier and presented over Realistic Nova-40 headphones.
Each trial began with one letter spoken to one ear followed by the other letter spoken to the other ear. Letter and ear were determined randomly. Spoken letters were separated in time by 175 ms. One of the two visual letters appeared on the computer screen in either the left or right screen position, 175 ms after completion of the second letter. As in previous experiments, then, there were two past-position attributes ("A" left and "E" fight, "E" left and "A" right) and four present-position attributes (A left, E left, A right, E right), which were used to create five memory classification tasks, Subjects pressed a left response key if the past position of the cued letter was left and a right response key if the past position was right. All other aspects of procedure duplicated Experiment 2. Table 3 . Subjects committed .04 errors overall. RTs and errors correlated .95. Stimulus analysis of the filtering task revealed that subjects responded to matching attributes 20 ms faster than to mismatching attributes. This congruity score was significantly greater than zero, t(9) ffi 2.76, p = .02.
Results

A summary of RTs and errors in this experiment appears in
Discussion
Experiment 3 demonstrated clearly that memory processing in the cross-modal situation is analogous to that obtained earlier in unimodal situations. When subjects are attempting to remember auditory spatial locations, they do not ignore variation in visual spatial location, at least when that visual stimulus acts as a cue. This finding is consistent with the account that we have offered thus far: The effect of present on past is due to the influence of abstract, meaning-based descriptions of spatial relations. Had a more perceptually based code mediated the results obtained earlier in unimodal processing, then we would not have expected such a straightforward replication in cross-modal processing. Moreover, the pattern of results, especially the consistent finding of attributebased congruity effects, fits better with a semantic than with a perceptual interpretation, as earlier research (cited above) has shown. 4 4 Unlike previous experiments, attributes of past position--left headphone or right headphone--mapped directly onto the response Experiment 4
In each of the earlier experiments, memory was tested using the Time h stimulus at Time t2 as the retrieval cue for spatial position. Thus, although the spatial position of the retrieval cue was sometimes irrelevant to the task, the identity of that stimulus (e.g., square or rectangle) was always relevant. Perhaps the influence of the present on processing of the past is restricted to those instances in which the distracting dimension is a physical characteristic of the retrieval cue. That is, perhaps past-present interactions of the sort reported above occur only when the distracting dimension is part of an event that must be processed to perform the criterial task.
We tested this possibility in Experiment 4 by separating the irrelevant dimension from the retrieval cue. Subjects made decisions about past visual positions, but these dimensions were cued by an auditory stimulus. Concurrent with the auditory cue, subjects viewed a visual stimulus. The position of the visual stimulus was either held constant in baseline tasks, or varied orthogonally across trials in filtering tasks. In this way, we are able to determine the role of an irrelevant dimension that is created by a stimulus that is itself irrelevant to the task.
Method
Subjects. Ten Purdue University students (5 men, 5 women) from the same pool as earlier experiments volunteered to participate.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. Stimuli were generated by an Amiga 500 microcomputer. All visual stimuli appeared in white against a blue background, each subtending approximately 1.94" of visual angle. The past-position display comprised a square and a triangle, one above the other (determined randomly), separated by 8.75* of visual angle. The display lasted for 910 ms. A visual and an auditory stimulus were presented 910 ms after termination of this display. The auditory stimulus was a spoken cue, either rectangle (ARPABET code ffi REHIKTAENXGUL.) or triangle (ARPABET code ffi TRAY4AENXGUL.). The retrieval cue was spoken binaurally; thus, its spatial location was held constant from trial to trial.
All physical characteristics of the synthesized voice matched those used in Experiment 3, except that the speaking rate here was increased to 400 words per minute (565-ms word duration). The spoken word rectangle was used, rather than square, to help equate the two cues in duration and phonetic similarity. The visual stimulus was a circle, appearing either high or low, in the exact location as one of the pastposition stimuli.
Subjects responded to the past position of the figure (square or triangle) cued by the spoken voice. Subjects were required to focus on the circle but were told that it is irrelevant to the response task. The location of the circle was held constant across trials in the baseline mode--left keypress or fight keypress. It is possible, then, that the pattern of results obtained here emerged from a competition between stimulus and response values, that is, that the effects are due to stimulus-response compatibility (see Proctor & Reeve, 1990) . In our view, however, the extremely close correspondence between the results of this experiment, where stimulus and response modes were correlated, and the previous experiments, where stimulus and response modes were orthogonal, considerably diminishes the force of this explanation. Experiment 6 of the present study corroborates this conclusion.
tasks and varied orthogonally in the filtering task. Only baseline and filtering tasks were analyzed in this experiment. All other aspects of procedure duplicated previous experiments.
Results
RTs and error rates in baseline and filtering tasks appear in Table 4 . The overall error rate was .05, and the speedaccuracy correlation was -.03.
The results of Experiment 4 were straightforward. Overall RT in the filtering task (652 ms) was equivalent to that in the baseline tasks (656 ms), F(2, 18) --1.24, ns, MSe = 753.41.
That is, there was no Garner interference. Similarly, the overall error rate in the filtering task (.04) did not differ from that in the baseline tasks (.05), F(2, 18) = .09, ns, MSe < .001.
Finally, the difference in RT to congruent and incongruent attributes of past position and present position (13 ms) was not reliable, t(9) = 1.33, ns.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 4 were compelling in the context of the previous experiments in this study. Earlier we found that variation in the spatial position of a cuing stimulus affected position classifications of a prior stimulus. Experiment 4 demonstrates that the effect of present on past is restricted to situations in which the irrelevant dimension is a dimension of the retrieval cue.
Informal interviews with the subjects revealed that they were conscious of the circle's constant (baseline) or varying (filtering) position, which indicates compliance with the requirement to focus on the irrelevant circle's vertical position. Yet this spatial information could apparently be separated by subjects from the spatial information required to make decisions about prior position. One way of characterizing this finding is that the configurality of the cue (of. Gluck & Bower, 1988 , 1990 Pomerantz, 1986) matters when processing the past. When the cuing dimension (i.e., information about stimulus identity) configures with the irrelevant dimension--that is, when both dimensions are perceived as part of the same event--then irrelevant (present) interacts with relevant (past). However, when the retrieval cue is perceptually separate from the irrelevant dimension, then that dimension can effectively be ignored during current processing. We will return to this issue in more detail in the General Discussion section. 
Results
The first four experiments tested how information about the present influences the processing of information from the past. In Experiment 5 we reverse this situation and ask, How does the past influence the present? This is a central question in much current research as, for example, in those experiments examining repetition priming or attribute retention (e.g., Kirsner & Dunn, 1985) . In Experiment 5 we are able to address the issue of whether subjects can make responses about the present and succeed in their attempts to ignore information that they carry about the past.
In this experiment, subjects were presented with two geometric figures in a left-right spatial relationship at Time t,. They were required to remember the spatial arrangement as part of an unspeeded recognition decision tested later. Next, at Time t2, one of the geometric figures reappeared in a left or right position, and subjects made a speeded classification decision about its current position. Of interest is whether the earlier spatial information affects the speeded decisions about the present spatial position. Finally, at Time t3, the two geometric figures were presented again in either a correct or incorrect Time tt ordering. By conditionalizing performance at Time t2 on correct retrieval of the original positions, we can be certain that the Time t~ values were encoded properly and maintained throughout Time t2 processing.
Method
Subjects. Ten Purdue University students (4 men, 6 women) from the same pool as earlier experiments volunteered to participate.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. As in Experiment 1, a Commodore 64 microcomputer was used to generate diamonds and circles either on the left or fight of the computer screen. The first display comprised a diamond on one side and a circle on the other. Subjects were required to remember which one was where. A second display followed, comprising only the diamond or only the circle. Subjects made an up--down joystick response to the figure's spatial position (response assignment counterbalanced), regardless of the identity of the figure. Size of stimuli, spatial separations, and stimulus display times were identical to those in Experiment 1.
In baseline tasks, the first display (at Time t,) remained the same throughout the task (e.g., always diamond left--circle right). In the filtering task, the first display was varied orthogonally with the second display (i.e., all eight possible combinations of first and second displays appeared equally often throughout the task). In the correlated tasks, the figure in the second display was correlated with the corresponding figure in the first display, with their spatial locations always matching (positively correlated) or always mismatching (negatively correlated).
After the speeded response to the position of the figure in the second display (at Time re), a third display appeared, which contained a representation of the two possible spatial configurations at Time tl (i.e., diamond left-circle right or diamond right--circle left). Each configuration appeared inside a reetangnlar shape, which was used to represent the screen's shape. Subjects made an unspeeded recognition decision about which configuration appeared at Time h. Subjects were constrained to be 100% accurate in this task (but not in the speeded task). If an incorrect response was made, feedback was provided and the entire trial was repeated later in the task. All other aspects duplicated Experiment 1. A summary of RTs and error rates in the speeded task appears in Table 5 . The speed-accuracy correlation was .66. As one can see from the table, the pattern of results is indicative of dimensional separability. This conclusion was confirmed in statistical analyses. An ANOVA of RTs showed that the five conditions (two baseline, two correlated, and one filtering) did not differ from each other, F(4, 36) = 0.63, ns, MSe = 778.36. Similarly, the five conditions did not differ in error proportions, F(4, 36) = 1.09, ns, MSe < 0.001. Finally, there was no effect of congruity (-3 ms), t(9) < 1, ns. One may note in Table 5 that subjects' classifications were much faster in this experiment than in previous ones, but these speeds are not atypical for perceptual judgments, even between interacting dimensions (cf. Melara & Marks, 1990a , 1990b , 1990d .
Discussion
The results of Experiment 5 showed that the past did not influence speeded decisions about the present, at least under the conditions tested here. Subjects could effectively ignore earlier spatial information, even though the position dimension was created by using the same shapes at Time tl as at Time t2. Results obtained when making on-line perceptual judgments thus may differ from those obtained when making memory judgments (Experiments 1 and 2) because in our earlier experiments an interaction was found when positional information was created by a single set of visual stimuli.
It may seem surprising that Garner interference was not obtained in Experiment 5. After all, in the baseline tasks a single memory display was used throughout, whereas in the faltering task the memory display changed unpredictably from trial to trial. Informal interviews with subjects after the experiment revealed one possible explanation: Subjects spontaneously adopted personal strategies that they used to overcome the memory load imposed by the display at Time tl. For example, subjects often associated each display at Time tt with a finger, which they then used to recognize that display at Time t3. A nonpracticed subject might not make the effort to develop special strategies to eliminate interference effects. However, it must be remembered that subjects in these experiments were well versed in the Garner paradigm and, in their approach to speeded classification tasks, may have at- In Experiment 6, subjects were required to remember positions in auditory space while making perceptual judgments about visual space. Thus Experiment 6 serves as the perceptual-judgment analogue of Experiment 3. As in Experiment 5, subjects made an unspeeded recognition decision after each speeded perceptual decision. To make the use of encoding strategies more uniform, all subjects adopted a single technique for remembering the positions of the auditory stimuli at Time h.
Method
Subjects. Ten subjects (4 men, 6 women) participated, all from the previous pool of practiced subjects.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. Auditory stimuli were the spoken letters A and E used in Experiment 3; visual stimuli were the printed letters A and E. All physical characteristics of these stimuli were identical to Experiment 3. The first display comprised the spoken letters, one presented to the left headphone and then one presented to the fight headphone. Subjects were required to remember the position of occurrence for each of the events. That is, either A or E was presented on either the left or the right, and 635 ms after termination of the first display, the visual display appeared. Subjects made speeded position classifications to these visual stimuli in either baseline tasks or filtering tasks (no correlated tasks were used), as in Experiment 5. After their speeded response, a third visual display appeared that probed the locations of the auditory stimuli at Time h. This part was unspeeded and accuracy was maintained at 100%, as in Experiment 5. To perform well on this recognition task, all subjects were told to associate the Time tt configuration with a finger of their left hand and then to use the finger as a basis for making the uuspeeded response. This allowed subjects to concentrate fully on the perceptual stimulus at Time t2, making these speeded decisions with the index and middle fingers of their right hand. Note that, as in Experiment 3, the stimulus and response modes were correlated. In all other respects, Experiment 6 duplicated previous experiments.
Results
RTs and errors for baseline tasks and filtering tasks of both experiments appear in Table 6 . The speed-accuracy correlation was .98. ANOVAs of RTs showed that performance in the filtering task (291 ms) did not differ significantly from performance in the baseline tasks (279 ms), F(2, 18) = 2.32, ns, MSe = 226.63. ANOVAs of error rates also showed no difference between baseline performance (.02) and filtering performance (.03), F(2, 18) = .66, ns, MS, < .001. Finally, a 5-ms effect of congruity was not reliable, t(9) = 2.06, p = .07.
Discussion
Experiment 6 replicated Experiment 5 in all principal respects. Subjects were able to avoid memory of past position when making speeded judgments of present position, even though the irrelevant dimension was correlated with the response mode. These results indicate that, when it is to subjects' benefit to ignore the dimension of past position, this dimension need not affect judgments of present position.
General Discussion
Six experiments were performed in this study to understand better the relationship between the processing of information in the present and the retrieval of information from the recent past. We tested spatial position, conceptualizing past position and present position as two dimensions of experience. We examined whether these dimensions, as analogous to typical perceptual dimensions, interact in speeded classification. By using speeded classification, we were able to perform a symmetrical analysis, evaluating the influence of the present on past processing (Experiments 1-4) and the influence of the past on present processing (Experiments 5-6). As a general statement, it appears that past and present are symmetrically separable dimensions, at least with respect to the dimensions tested here. Experiment 4 demonstrated that present position need not influence judgments of past position; Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that. past position need not influence judgments of present position.
We stress that this conclusion rests on our definition of dimension. Throughout this study we have considered a dimension, in concert with the usual Gamerian definition, as an abstract continuum not tied necessarily to a particular stimulus. Thus, in Experiment 4, the dimension of past position was defined in terms of one geometric object, whereas the dimension of present position was defined in terms of a different geometric object. Under these conditions, where the stimulus attribute is not referenced to a single coincidence in space or time, we can conclude that past and present are mutually separable aspects of experience.
But perhaps this definition is too extreme, especially for applications of the Garner paradigm to the study of memory processing. An alternative conceptualization of information from dimensions, one that may fit better with issues of time and memory, emphasizes the stimulus in experience. In this view, a stimulus is characterized by values on dimensions; thus, values take on meaning only with respect to the stimuli about which they refer. A high spatial position, for example, may be meaningful only with regard to a specific object (e.g., triangle) and frame of reference. In the context of the present investigation, this alternative view emphasizes changes in a given stimulus over time: Did a certain triangle, for example, change its position from Time tt to Time t27 Theoretically, the issue now becomes one of how cognitive systems process a single stimulus as it travels through time.
When considered in this way, past and present appear to relate to each other asymmetrically. As shown in Experiments 1, 2, and 5, perceiving some characteristic of a stimulus (e.g., a triangle's spatial position) affects but is not affected by the perceiver's recent memory of that stimulus characteristic. Moreover, as shown in Experiments 3 and 6, this asymmetry is maintained in the face of indirect reference to the stimulus, as when an auditory label signals a visual stimulus. Finally, as shown in Experiments 1-3, the interaction between past and present position appears to have a postperceptual origin, as indicated by the recurrence of the pattern that Melara and Marks (1990a , 1990b , 1990d call semantic crosstalk. This set of results suggests the following conclusion: .Processing systems tie attributes to stimuli and, in so doing, tie the present to the past.
By emphasizing the role of the stimulus in processing, one is led to hypothesize that a logical asymmetry may exist between past and present: Decisions about the past require reference to the present, whereas decisions about the present do not require reference to the past. This logical asymmetry may in turn spawn the processing asymmetry that we uncovered in these experiments. In other words, to classify position at Time h, subjects must first process relevant characteristics of the cue at Time t2 (i.e., its identity). Results of this study suggest that when processing the cue, the cue's irrelevant characteristics (i.e., the cue's position) cannot be ignored. In contrast, to classify position at Time t2, characteristics of the past (Time tl) are unnecessary (even though, in these experiments, values from Time h needed to be held in memory to perform the subsequent recognition test). One might argue, then, that the logical asymmetry led to a processing asymmetry: The past requires cognitive reference to the present, but not vice versa. This view fits well with theories of retrieval derived from the principle of encoding specificity (e.g., TUlving, 1983; Tulving & Thomson, 1973) : According to this view, cues at Time t2 constrain the nature of information retrieved from Time tt. A logical asymmetry suggests that such constraints must exist.
Caveats
We have suggested, on the basis of foregoing analysis, that stimulus dimensions displaced in time interact asymmetrically. This conclusion is premature, however, because two questions not yet discussed can complicate interpretations of dimensional interaction: (a) Do asymmetrical speeds of discrimination cause spurious asymmetries in processing? (b) How can dimensions that are temporally (or spatially) separate not be separable? We discuss these questions in turn.
Baseline Discriminability
When researchers interpret performance in speeded classification tasks, they customarily abide by what we shall call the rule of matched discriminability. This rule states that when the pattern of interaction between any two dimensions is being compared, those dimensions must be matched in their baseline discdminabilities, that is, the speed to discriminate values on each dimension at baseline. Otherwise, as Garner (1983) has warned, false asymmetries in interaction can develop. Indeed, Felfoldy and Garner (1971) have shown that dimensions that are separable when matched at baseline can nonetheless yield Garner interference if their discriminabilities are mismatched. Typically, when mismatched discriminability is at issue, one finds that the more discriminable dimension affects classification of the less discriminable dimension, but not vice versa.
In the present study, baseline decisions about present position were much faster than baseline decisions about past position (cf. baseline RTs in Experiments 1 and 5). Moreover, present position, whose values at baseline were relatively well discriminated, affected past position, whose values at baseline were relatively poorly discriminated, but not vice versa. Thus, one might claim that a mismatch in discriminability existed and that this mismatch produced the asymmetric pattern.
Although the rule of matched discriminability is clearly a problem, we believe that the rule becomes less of a problem when it is applied to comparisons between a past dimension and a present dimension. For example, if one accepts that decisions about the past require processing of the present, then decisions about the past will take longer than decisions about the present, all things being equal. This logical asymmetry and, as this study demonstrates, the processing asymmetry only hold when the irrelevant characteristic is configural with the cue; otherwise, as in Experiment 4, there is no asymmetry even though the dimensions are still mismatched at baseline. Thus, when the dimensions under study are displaced in time, it may make little sense to require that speeds of the two discriminations be equivalent. Indeed, as we have argued here, the very existence of the mismatch is informative about the nature of processing.
The rule of matched discriminability was developed originally with judgments of present (i.e., perceptual) dimensions in mind. In that context, it seems appropriate to require that the psychological distance separating values on dimensions be equated. It is important to note that attaining equivalence in these cases is typically a simple matter of adjusting physical differences along one or the other dimension. Suppose, for example, that the dimensions are pitch and loudness and that pitch is more discriminable than loudness. To match discriminabilities, one can simply select new values on the pitch dimension that are more similar in hertz.
The situation changes when judgments of the past are being evaluated because adjustments in the physical dimension may be gratuitous. In the present experiments, for example, the physical difference in spatial positions at Time tl was typically equal to the physical difference in spatial positions at Time t2. The speed of decision making, however, was always faster at Time t2 than at Time h. One might make the physical differences smaller at Time t2 than at Time t~ in the hope of equating response speeds, but this maneuver clearly distorts the logic behind comparing a single dimension displaced in time. We argue instead that it is prudent to reject the rule of matched discriminability in cases, such as ours, in which physical differences on one dimension are equated at Time tl and at Time t2.
Nature of Dimensional Interaction
Because our goal was to examine the interactive pattern between information at two different times, one can question whether the concept of interaction or separability applies at all. In other words, subjects do not confuse the stimulus display at Time tl with that at Time t2; thus, one might ask, Aren't such temporally separate dimensions separable by definition? We believe not, because this question is itself rooted in a traditional but outdated account of the nature of dimensional interaction.
In this study, we conceptualized dimensional interaction or separability solely in operational terms: Interacting dimensions are those that lead to Garner interference; separable dimensions are those that yield no Garner interference. The traditional view holds that interacting dimensions (sometimes known as integral dimensions) are those that fuse together into a whole or blob. The idea behind a blob is that the initial perception of a stimulus can be represented as an unanalyzed point in some multidimensional Euclidean space whose reference axes are arbitrary (see Lockhead, 1972 Lockhead, , 1979 Shepp, 1989) . According to this view, dimensions can form blobs (i.e., interact) only if they are coincident in space and time. Because our dimensions are separated in time, they cannot interact.
Recent evidence indicates that, at least in its strongest versions, the blob account is incorrect. The blob model predicts, for example, that performance in speeded classification with interacting dimensions should be equivalent no matter what reference axes are used to construct stimulus sets. Melara and Marks (1990c) showed, however, that interacting dimensions are characterized by dimensional primacy: One orientation in the space appears to have processing priority compared with all others. More germane to the present study, the blob model maintains that dimensions separated in space or time do not interact. However, Melara and his colleagues (Melara, 1989a; Melara & Marks, 1990d; Melara & O'Bden, 1987) have shown that dimensions from separate sensory moralities (e.g., vision and audition) can interact in speeded classification, even when dimensional attributes are separated in time.
A view of dimensional interaction more consistent with these new findings implicates channels of processing that operate on dimensional input at different levels of analysis, as was discussed earlier and portrayed in Figure 1 . In this regard, dimensions separated in time need not be separable. Nonetheless, the level at which crosstalk occurs between such dimensions may be restricted to postperceptual levels, as we have claimed is the case in this study. The important point, though, is that the same powerful analytic techniques that are used to study perceptual interactions can be brought to bear on memory processes, that is, on the integration of stimuli separated in time. We hope that the present study goes some way toward demonstrating the merit of this new approach.
